Book Review | Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Critical Study of Peace Negotiations, Mediation and Facilitation Between Israel and the PLO

Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Critical Study of Peace Negotiations, Mediation and Facilitation Between Israel and the PLO, by Raphael Cohen-Almagor, is a timely book on one of the most intractable conflict dynamics of the modern international political era. The book aims to distill the causes of the failure of various attempts to reach a peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and above all what can be learned for future negotiations.

Instead of simply tracing the diplomatic efforts over the years, Cohen-Almagor examines the conditions that make for the success or failure of peace negotiations. A key strength of the book is that it is not merely a study of past failures, but also includes concrete proposals for building a more sustainable peace.

The book is based on extensive research. Cohen-Almagor has used primary and secondary sources, as well as archival research conducted in London, Jerusalem, Washington and Oslo. An important aspect of the book is the more than one hundred semi-structured interviews conducted with senior officials and diplomats from the ten countries and the United Nations. The oral-history element of this interview material adds an important dimension to the study. The methodology is especially suitable for a study on peace negotiations as official agreements and diplomatic records frequently provide information about what governments formally agreed to but not why individual negotiators made specific decisions. Theories of justice, conflict resolution, negotiation, mediation and facilitation, compromise, spoiler management are included in the author’s conceptual framework. This interdisciplinary approach enriches this book by both articulating a cross-cutting understanding of the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians and also highlighting the shortcomings of such a one-dimensional perspective.

Analysis of the Oslo peace process is very rich. Cohen-Almagor describes how the Oslo process came about through private and informal talks in Norway led by Norwegian brokers, with unofficial Israeli and Palestinian representatives. The exercise was conducted in a manner that kept the process secret. This enabled the participants to look at potential options without having to deal with the political pressures immediately that would come with formal talks. Thus, flexibility and trust were vital to the breakthrough. The author also does not call Oslo an unproblematic diplomatic triumph as he notes that the agreements had significant flaws. The key questions on final status – such as Jerusalem, settlements, refugees and Palestinian statehood – were left unresolved.

The Palestinian Authority was given limited autonomy, and the partition of the West Bank into Areas A, B and C resulted in a fractured political and administrative structure. These unanswered questions left room for later political developments and violence. The downward spiral of trust needed for ongoing talks was damaged by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the rise to power of Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian militant attacks and Israeli settlement expansion. Also insufficient progress was made on vital pledges on both sides which hindered the process from gaining momentum. The author thus demonstrates that peace agreements need to be both politically astute and institutionally effective. In other words, they must be led by people who are prepared to shield the process from domestic political pressures and violent spoilers.

The evaluation of the 2000 Camp David Summit is equally fascinating. Cohen-Almagor notes the growing tension between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and the obstacles posed by the political situation in the negotiations. The author explains why the summit was called despite many differences and poor preparation. Doubt was caused by Palestinian fears over settlement building in the West Bank and Israel’s inability to meet some earlier commitments, as well as the Palestinians’ doubts about the fairness of the US as mediator. It also demonstrates, with reference to the Clinton Parameters and the Taba talks, that there were some areas where compromise could have been reached but political conditions made it impossible for the two sides to translate the proposals into a viable agreement.

The book also devotes much attention to the Annapolis process and talks between Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert. In Cohen-Almagor’s view, this was among the more encouraging times for significant advances. Abbas saw these negotiations as serious, while Olmert was ready to make big concessions. However, the uncertain political environment, lack of confidence, ongoing settlements and declining position of Olmert at home prevented the process from succeeding. This analysis strengthens the author’s thesis that reasonableness is not enough for successful negotiations. Leaders must have public backing to make and execute tough compromises.

The book’s most important lessons are on trust, leadership and principled compromise. Cohen-Almagor claims that compromise is not a give-up on justice, but rather a process that allows for reconciliation between conflicting national claims. The conflict has historical narratives and security concerns, as well as questions of territoriality and identity. Thus, neither side has much of a chance to have everything it wants. For sustainable peace, the other party’s political and human concerns must be recognised, and hard compromises made. Another point that the author makes is the importance of political courage. Leaders who engage in peace negotiations have to be able to risk and stand up for compromise in the face of domestic opposition.

Mediators and facilitators is another important theme in the book. The Norwegian, American and other international experiences show that external actors can enable dialogue, offer assurances and be able to help mediate differences. But mediation may be unsuccessful if either party feels that the mediator is not impartial. Cohen-Almagor underscores the need for credible and persistent mediation. Intermediaries need to have comprehensive knowledge of the interests of all parties involved and enough trust to enable compromise.

The last part of the book sees Cohen-Almagor move from diagnoses to prescriptions. These include reconstructing Gaza, promoting cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in non-security and economic matters, delegitimising and disarming any militant organisations, improving democratic governance and working towards a two-state solution. The author further explores the prospect of greater unity between Palestine and Jordan, though Gaza would only be a part of such a unity under the right conditions and political circumstances. The book’s main importance lies in the fact that it recognises that a final political settlement cannot succeed without functional institutions, security mechanisms and economic and humanitarian bases. However, there are practical challenges for some of these recommendations. Cooperation among militant organisations, building trust in political process and democratic institutions, and demilitarising would be highly challenging.

In sum, Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is a valuable book for the study of international conflict and peace negotiations. Its empirical approach makes it the most outstanding. Cohen-Almagor shows through the examples of Oslo, Camp David, the post-Camp David era and Annapolis, that there have been numerous opportunities for peace, but they have been thwarted by mistrust, violence, insufficient implementation and leadership failures. The main lesson is to make peace a long-term strategy and not a short-term diplomatic move.

The book is a brilliant guide to the thinking about future options as it provides valuable evidence and practical insights to students, scholars, diplomats and policy-makers regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the challenging realities for establishing a basis for sustained peace and mutually beneficial coexistence.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.