Azerbaijan’s War in Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey’s Role: The Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus

Turkey’s decisive military support and involvement on behalf of Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) war demonstrated a radical transformation in Ankara’s foreign policy. Unlike the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the early 1990s, during which Turkey adopted a significantly more cautious posture mainly limited to diplomatic and political support, the 2020 war was marked by comprehensive and direct Turkish military engagement. This sharp contrast cannot be explained solely by regional or global geopolitical factors; it is also driven by Turkey’s domestic political dynamics and state restructuring. The autocratic turn in Turkey over the past decade has led to the restructuring of state institutions. This process was accompanied by the monopolisation of decision-making mechanisms, the transformation of civil-military relations, and the institutionalisation of revisionist security identity. The neutralisation of the traditional system of internal checks and balances, along with growing national defence industry, is precisely what enabled the administration to abandon its previous bureaucratic caution and adopt a markedly more aggressive and revisionist foreign policy behaviour.

Over the past decade, Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone profound militarisation, manifesting a new security and revisionist identity. The traditional Kemalist defensive paradigm has given way to neo-Ottoman and nationalist revisionism, which prioritises the use of hard power and military interventions in neighbouring regions. As the analysis of Turkey’s behaviour and role in the 2020 Karabakh War demonstrates, alongside the variables of the international system, significant determining factors included Turkey’s domestic institutional transformations, the monopolisation of decision-making, the dismantling of traditional mechanisms of checks and balances, the strategy of self-sufficiency in military capabilities, and the institutionalisation of a new security identity.

This aggressive posture became possible due to radical domestic transformations within the state. Unlike the 1990s, when President Turgut Ozal’s militant and interventionist initiatives and vision were constrained by the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, i.e. military-bureaucratic system. In the absence of a unified foreign policy consensus among key state actors and institutions, Turkey’s strategic posture remained constrained. The Erdogan administration has overseen a complete erosion of the system of constitutional checks and balances. The consolidation of an autocratic system, which accelerated following the attempted military coup in 2016, led to the strict monopolisation and hyper-personalisation of foreign and security policy decision-making. Traditional institutions were de-institutionalised: the military, which had a great and indisputable influence in domestic and foreign policy, lost its former autonomy and was entirely subordinated to political authority, the MFA was increasingly politicised, while the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) was transformed into an instrument directly subordinate to the president, serving his geopolitical ambitions. Simultaneously, the alliance between the ruling party and nationalist factions ideologically legitimised this militant course, creating an environment conducive to risk-prone manoeuvres.

These institutional transformations were directly coupled with Turkey’s military metamorphosis and the unprecedented development of its national defence industry. Over the last decade, the expansion of military capabilities and the attainment of a degree of self-sufficiency in the defence sector led to a sharp increase in Turkey’s military and geopolitical self-confidence. The instrumentalisation of hard power became the key pillar of Ankara’s new regional policy, allowing the authorities to unreservedly conduct military operations in Syria, Libya, and subsequently engage in the South Caucasus.

These internal changes, along with growing military capabilities and self-assurance, were directly reflected in Turkey’s policy toward Azerbaijan. Since the 2010 strategic agreement on mutual assistance, Turkey purposefully integrated the armed forces of both countries, decoupling the Azerbaijani army from its Soviet legacy and restructuring it according to the principles of the Turkish military school. Consequently, during the 2020 war, Turkey exhibited unprecedented involvement. High-ranking Turkish military officers engaged in planning and commanding military operations, MIT provided intelligence oversight and facilitated the transfer of Syrian mercenaries, and the output of the Turkish defence industry secured a decisive advantage for Azerbaijan. Militarised self-confidence allowed Turkey to successfully alter the status quo in the South Caucasus and challenge Russia’s exclusive influence in the region. Incidentally, Ankara’s official statements on various occasions regarding Turkey’s role, along with the emphasis on Erdogan’s leadership in this matter, began to provoke jealousy and anger in Baku.

In conclusion, Turkey’s unprecedented and aggressive involvement in the 2020 war was also the direct result of internalising historical lessons. The passivity and institutional caution exhibited during the First Karabakh War in the 1990s were perceived by the current Turkish military-political elite as strategic “mistakes” that could not be repeated. This bitter historical experience, combined with the monopolised decision-making afforded by Erdogan’s autocratic system and militarised self-confidence, compelled Ankara to act in an exceptionally assertive manner. Ultimately, the 2020 Karabakh War was not merely a military victory for its ally Azerbaijan; it served as a symbolic and practical validation of Turkey’s transformed state and security identity, as well as its ambition to establish itself as the undisputed hegemonic pole of the “Turkic world.”

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.