Ending the War in Ukraine: Prospective Challenges and Nuclear Issues
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The war in Ukraine has now outlasted in time the duration of World War I and continues to be the largest war in Europe since World War II. The military facts on the ground point to de facto stalemate as Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to slug it out with drone and missile strikes against military and civilian targets, including long range attacks on war supporting industries and other national infrastructure. Appalling casualty rates among Ukrainian and Russian soldiers continued to stress the two sides’ capabilities for meeting manpower requirements, but both Moscow and Kiev found creative approaches to replace their losses.
For many politicians and media in the United States, the war in Ukraine had taken a back seat in their priorities, compared to the U.S. war with Iran launched February 28 in Operation Epic Fury. At the Ankara NATO summit earlier this year, Trump again chided his European NATO allies for their allegedly insufficient support for the war against Iran and, especially, for their hesitancy in supporting naval operations to keep open the Strait of Hormuz. Some of this hesitation was understandable, given the U.S. lack of prior consultation with NATO allies or even advanced warning prior to the attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, ballistic missiles and launchers, air forces and air defenses, maritime forces, and command and control targets, including specifically designated leadership targets among the Ayatollahs and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Critics of President Trump attacked his administration for engaging in a war of choice against Iran while neglecting the war of necessity being fought by Ukraine against Russia. On the other hand, Trump’s instinctive revulsion at the continued slaughter in Ukraine and his desire to bring a halt to the carnage can only be seconded by governments and publics alike. The sad fact remains that starting wars is easier than stopping them. And the longer a war proceeds and the higher the costs of war on people and their values, the more resistant leaders and publics can become to agreeing a peace. History is full of wars that, from the standpoint of humanitarian decency and even sound military practice, continued longer and to greater misfortune than originally expected by their warlords.
Going forward, challenges to peacemaking efforts in Ukraine can be grouped into two categories: those having to do with possible “land swaps” as between Ukraine and Russia; and, second, those having to do with security guarantees provided by NATO, either as an alliance or by individual member states with military resources to do so. The second of these involves factors related to nuclear weapons, including deterrence and crisis stability.
As to the first, land swaps, there is considerable talk about Russia’s apparent demand for complete control over the Donbas region, including those parts of Donetsk currently occupied by Ukrainian forces. It was not entirely clear what Russia would “swap” in return for Ukrainian willingness to turn over all of Donetsk to Russia’s postwar control. The mechanics of troop movements would be complicated for both sides, and a new line of control in eastern Ukraine might need to be policed by some multinational peacekeeping force.
The preceding point brings us to the second category of issues that have to be decided: security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. Here the debate within and among NATO governments is about how extensive and binding those security guarantees will have to be. NATO’s Article 5 commits all members of the alliance to support any member state subject to military attack by an outside party. Given the disparity among NATO states’ military capabilities, the actual threat or use of military force against Russia would rest mainly on the shoulders of states with relatively larger military budgets and armed forces. Obviously this would include the United States.
Therefore, a postwar security guarantee for Ukraine would likely involve the United States, the UK, and France, among others, in a commitment to deploy military forces and-or supporting infrastructure in Ukraine. Whether this would include American “boots on the ground” is a sensitive topic for understandable reasons, but the plain fact is that, without U.S. military support inside and outside of Ukraine, any postwar constabulary deterrent lacks credibility. In round numbers, the United States has some 84,000 troops deployed in Europe, about half of which are Army units that rotate in and out. It is therefore conceivable that a U.S. Army brigade or so might be stationed in Ukraine or nearby alongside other NATO forces. As well, the U.S. would certainly be providing a significant share of the airpower that would be necessary to deter further attacks against Ukrainian territory, as well as air defences, ammunition, long range missiles, and the accoutrements of command, control, communications and intelligence support - in other words, the space and terrestrially-based vitals of warning, attack assessment, and coordination of responses among multinational forces in case of war.
Another aspect of the security guarantee issue is the significance of nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear deterrence in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia and between the latter and NATO. Russia’s abundant less than strategic or operational-tactical nuclear weapons exceed in number those of the United States that are deployed in Europe and presumably available to NATO. On numerous occasions, Putin or his surrogates have referred to the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in situations of high threat to the Russian Federation and its regime. Under the recently expired New START arms control regime, Russia also shared essential parity with the United States in their numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and launchers. The UK and France also deploy their own national nuclear forces on ballistic missile submarines and also, in the French case, on aircraft based on land or at sea.
An enduring peace settlement for Ukraine also will have to address the problem of possible future nuclear coercion by Russia, against Ukraine, and also against NATO as a means of weakening its support for Ukraine. To this end, Russia should not be permitted to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any other state that borders Ukraine (e.g. Belarus). In addition, the demise of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) should be revisited, and a return to something like the former INF regime in the European theater of operations (but not necessarily elsewhere) should be discussed by Russia and NATO. INF prohibited the deployment of ground based intermediate or shorter-range missiles by cooperating states and served as an important constraint on missile proliferation and, therefore, on military escalation. The United States separately as well as NATO should declare that Ukraine is a nuclear free zone and that under no circumstances should Ukraine become a nuclear weapons state. In return, Russia should forswear the use of nuclear blackmail against Ukraine and be reminded that NATO has a nuclear deterrent shield that includes Ukraine, not as a member state, but as a strategic partner.
In conclusion, there are many concerns that will have to be addressed by heads of state and their military advisors before a viable peace settlement of the war between Russia and Ukraine becomes possible. The assumption that Ukraine, supported by NATO, and Russia can both continue feeding forces into a meat grinder without existential danger to Europe is misplaced optimism. Getting to yes is going to require a great deal of patient diplomacy and a willingness on all sides to engage in controversial trade-offs that may not play well on the evening news. The alternative is to continue inexorably in the “march to the Marne” mindset until escalation control disintegrates into military miscreance and political absurdity.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.