Measuring the Quad by What It Does, Not What It Is Not

The reemergence of the Quad in 2017 has generated recurring discussions, “Does the Quad aim to be an Asian NATO?” and “Does it need to pursue further institutionalisation?” These types of questions risk creating a misunderstanding of its objectives. In fact, the Quad does not have a mutual-defence commitment or an integrated command-and-control structure. In addition, each member has its own alliance relationships, strategic traditions, and domestic political constraints. Thus, it is more constructive to look at its potential through flexible, issue-specific cooperation, rather than discussing the proximity to a formal alliance.

This analytical angle is increasingly supported by the Quad’s agenda. The most recent case is the May 2026 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi, where the member states identified four areas of cooperation: maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. At the same time, they launched the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC), expanded the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), and began developing a Common Operational Picture across the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, they announced a new Critical Minerals Initiative Framework, which was first referred to at the previous Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 2025. Also, they agreed to support Fiji in developing port infrastructure and capacity as part of their economic prosperity agenda. All these initiatives show the Quad’s nature: practical cooperation first, institutional format second.

This approach is pragmatic and feasible for advancing effective cooperation without getting stuck in consensus-building on every strategic issue. Especially in terms of threat perceptions regarding China, the Quad members still differ in their alliance commitments and approaches. The Quad’s informality provides a feasible format for four members to coordinate security activities, even though each has its own position on China. Typical areas include maritime domain awareness (MDA), resilient undersea cables, critical-mineral supply chains and disaster relief. These areas do not require a unified strategic doctrine or a collective defence commitment. Information sharing, compatible systems, technical standards and coordinated implementation are the main components of its cooperation. Some critics see the Quad’s informality as a source of uncertainty. Yet its record suggests that flexibility has often enabled cooperation that a more formal structure might have delayed.

The next step should be to utilise this logic beyond the four members themselves. Exclusiveness may harm the Quad’s development, but inclusiveness offers greater potential for functioning as a network enabler, connecting regional partners, existing institutions, private companies and technical agencies to capabilities developed through Quad cooperation. Based on this model, the structure of cooperation can vary from function to function. For example, MDA may require links with coastal states and maritime agencies; undersea-cable resilience depends on governments, industry and telecommunications providers; critical-mineral security requires private investment as well as public policy; and humanitarian assistance depends on effective coordination with regional governments and relevant organisations, including militaries, NGOs and medical institutions.

The July 2026 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila also points in this direction. The four members reaffirmed ASEAN unity and centrality and committed themselves to supporting practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific through the same four priority areas. This approach is worth noting because cooperation with Southeast Asian states, Pacific Island countries and Indian Ocean partners need not require these partners to align politically with the Quad. Thus, the Quad can complement existing regional mechanisms by focusing on concrete requirements and areas of common interest.

The above-mentioned initiatives provide a foundation for such a networked approach. IPMDA and the emerging Common Operational Picture can improve regional maritime awareness. Quad cooperation on undersea cables can support digital resilience across the Pacific. The Indo-Pacific Logistics Network can improve coordination in responding to natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons. These mechanisms should increasingly connect with ASEAN-led arrangements, the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Pacific Islands Forum where their functions align with regional needs. Similar connections with private-sector actors will be particularly important in critical minerals, telecommunications and emerging technologies, where governments alone cannot create resilient supply chains or common technical ecosystems.

For India, such an approach provides additional opportunities. It enables New Delhi to expand practical security cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific without requiring a formal alliance commitment. Broadly speaking, it allows all four members to contribute in areas where their interests overlap while accepting differences in sensitive areas. A networked Quad that connects with existing regional architecture may therefore be more effective than a more formal but inward-looking institution.

The Quad’s success should not be measured by how closely it imitates NATO. It should be measured by how effectively it can generate and connect concrete capabilities across the Indo-Pacific—from maritime information and resilient supply chains to digital infrastructure and disaster-response logistics. Its flexibility is not a weakness that must eventually be overcome. Properly used, it is the foundation for deeper functional cooperation and wider regional resilience.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.