The Bipolar Trap: How US-China Rivalry Shrinks Strategic Autonomy

Over the last couple of years or more, there has been a great strategic debate around the world pertaining to one question: what will happen if China and the USA go to war in the future? Perhaps this concern is inevitable. As we saw, China's formidable rise and American supremacy around the world is fading to a certain extent if not diminishing. The current thinking toward China is plagued by pseudo-realism. In this emerging context, "Thucydides trap" indicates that conflict may occur if hegemonic power is challenged by any rising power. Instead of evaluating China uniquely, many self-proclaimed realists incorrectly treat Beijing as a modern incarnation of the Soviet Union. Using the Cold War context to navigate US-China relations is a convenient but costly shortcut. Applying Soviet-era playbooks to China mistakenly assumes the two historical adversaries share the same vulnerabilities and motives. Rivalries between two will decide the future trajectory of the international order.

Instead of outright war between the US and China, the ultimate international danger constitutes the blind adherence of two power framework as the natural order of international politics. This triggers the forced-choice paradox, in which states sideline their sovereign goals and are compelled to choose sides towards one or the other. With two-sided reasoning on the rise, the globe is dividing into competing blocs that have to bind together not just security objectives, but also common histories, ideological definitions and a vision of order. This trap operates by reducing the number of options available to states. Countries are being judged by their allegiance to one of the two competing factions and are no longer viewed as independent sovereign actors. Strategic autonomy becomes linked with hesitation, a mark of frailty. Analysts, writers and strategists often ask themselves if countries will firmly back China or the United States. The question exposes the main problem. It presupposes that the future world order will be neatly structured by just two mighty hegemonies. The American President Donald Trump and the Chinese President Xi Jinping seem to symbolise two drastically divergent political ideas. Trump pledges to "Make America Great Again." Xi is aiming for the "Great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". The former promotes US supremacy, the latter aspires to restore Beijing's historical status.

Still, under those contrasts exists a compelling parallel. Both leaders shape governance using narratives of state restoration. Trump's magnetism depends partly on arguing that globalisation degraded American industry, weakened autonomy, and allowed its rivals gain through losses. Xi's strategic vision perfectly reflects today's China, which has risen above historical subjugation and is reviving its traditional international prominence. Under both scenarios, the states' past acts not only serve as a remembrance but as a tool of statecraft. The past legitimises ongoing geopolitical struggles and converts strategic manoeuvring into an existential struggle. Consequently, disputes over trade and commerce, security and technology progressively morph into a cultural scale. This friction becomes tougher to compartmentalise trade wars transform into meaningful struggles. Innovation rivalry shifts into competing models of social progress. Reaching an agreement grows tougher as both powers increasingly develop bilateral relations using the framework of decay, resurgence and patriotic duty.

Paradoxically, the peril could grow although US and China effectively avoid war. A peaceful alignment among two superpowers could still produce an extremely volatile world. The further America and China defines global diplomacy via rhetoric of civilisational competition, the greater coercion other societies endure to align with that rivalry. What seems stable at the tier of major power diplomacy may generate turbulence inside and amongst communities. The results are already apparent. Digital networks are fragmenting. Logistics pathways are being reorganised according to territorial motives. Academics, businesses and research institutions progressively develop under tactical scrutiny. Matters that once functioned largely as economic or trade are presently seen through the lens of national security. In the current situation, China and America are not battling, but they are currently in perpetual disputes. Rather than manifesting itself largely through armed clashes, rivalry progressively develops through digital benchmarks, funding webs, supply chains, information system and rivalling argument for authority. The outcome is a slow narrowing of diplomatic space. Detailed positions grow harder to maintain. Tactical adaptability is increasingly regarded with distrust. Consequently, it is not a way to divide the two superpowers. Instead, the goal is to stop the China-US rivalry from dictating the sole aspects of international politics.

Here, is precisely the significance of middle power nations becomes clear. States such as Japan, Australia, Indonesia, India, and the EU are often seen as insignificant players navigating within a divided world. Indeed, these countries could be important stabilising anchors for balance in the emerging global system. India perhaps provides a clear picture of these processes. New Delhi has tactical partnerships with the USA in the Quad, is an active member of BRICS and has strategic partnerships across Eurasia and the Global South. India wants to maintain its strategic autonomy and widen its diplomatic choices. The new global order will not be created in Beijing or Washington alone. And it will be shaped by capitals that refuse to accept polarisation as their fate: Tokyo, Delhi, Seoul, Brussels, Canberra and others. The China-India competition is not the greatest threat to the international system. The rivalry of great powers is a fact of history. The genuine concern is that everybody else has to define their future according to that competition, which is a significant threat. That is the bipolar trap and avoiding it may be the greatest geopolitical task of the 21st century.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.