Washington’s Greenland Gambit: What the Shifting Arctic Order Means for India

On 18th September 2026, President Trump, in a Truth Social post, announced the conclusion of a landmark security pact with Denmark and Greenland that will give America “permanent control over security and all other needs in Greenland”. Signed on 22nd September 2026, the agreement expands U.S. access beyond Pituffik Space Base in Greenland to additional defence areas – facilitating military movement and possible new installations, strengthening NATO’s Arctic role, and supports U.S. missile-defence architecture. It also tightens scrutiny of non-allied military presence and sensitive foreign investment, particularly in critical infrastructure and resources, while seeking continuity of these arrangements even if Greenland’s constitutional status changes.

This marks a major development against the backdrop of President Trump’s repeated threats to acquire the semi-autonomous territory under the Kingdom of Denmark on security grounds. For NATO allies, particularly Denmark, this development appears to be a relatively good bargain compared to a hostile American behaviour, which could have precipitated a collapse of the transatlantic alliance. Copenhagen and Nuuk have framed the arrangement as a strengthening of Arctic and North Atlantic security rather than a loss of sovereignty and the right to self-determination of the as Greenlanders.

As for the Americans, their fascination with Greenland has historic roots. There have been attempts to acquire Greenland by the US in 1867, 1910, 1946 and 1955. But President Trump in his second term upped the ante on this front, repeatedly threatening to annex it. Experts believe this to be a manifestation of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, outlined in the US National Security Strategy 2025, which attempts to secure American domination of the “Western Hemisphere”.

American interest in Greenland stems from multiple factors. Firstly, Greenland has abundant resources which include hydrocarbons such as oil and natural gas; critical minerals such as lithium, graphite, tungsten, palladium, vanadium, zinc, gold, uranium, copper and nearly 1.5 million tonnes of rare earth reserves. Secondly, the US seeks to contain Chinese and Russian influence in the Arctic, specifically targeting dual-use infrastructure investments, resource extraction ventures, critical sector acquisitions, and intelligence-gathering operations. Thirdly, Greenland, due to its strategic location at the intersection of North America, Europe and the Arctic, offers an ideal vantage point for ballistic missile early warning systems while facilitating space-based surveillance and maritime monitoring across the critical Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. Lastly, climate-change-induced Arctic sea-ice melt is opening new shipping routes such as the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route (NSR), making Greenland a strategically vital geographical frontier.

How should India view this security agreement? At first, India may appear as a distant player with no direct link with this development. However, the developments in Greenland are emblematic of broader shifts taking place in the wider Arctic region. Historically speaking, India has never been a stranger to this region. India’s engagement with the Arctic began with the signing of the Svalbard Treaty in 1920 and has subsequently involved sending scientific expeditions including the construction of the “Himadri” research station in 2008. In 2013, India became an observer in the Arctic Council, the regional governance body. The region holds significance for India in domains such as climate science, monsoon dynamics, disaster risk, energy transition, biodiversity conservation and connectivity.

From India’s vantage point, the Greenland Security pact may advance some of its interests and create new opportunities in several sectors. India can, for instance, leverage its ties with the Nordics and the US in the domain of resource collaboration for building resilient supply chains of critical minerals including rare earths for mitigating vulnerabilities arising from over-dependence on select geographies.

As America aims for a balance of power in the Arctic region, the pact will serve as a counterweight to Chinese penetration in the form of infrastructure projects like the “Polar Silk Road” – an extension of its Belt and Road initiative (BRI), investments in ice-breaking technology, dual-use infrastructure and critical energy projects. As new shipping routes in Artic opens – such as the NSR, Greenland’s position gives the U.S. and NATO greater capacity for maritime surveillance, domain awareness, protection of infrastructure and monitoring movements between the Arctic and the North Atlantic. This would enable containment of China in the region, which would be a strategic gain for Indian interests in the region.

On the flip side, the neo-imperialist undercurrent behind the security pact legitimises sphere-of-influence politics and sets a dangerous precedent: one that could embolden China to adopt a more belligerent posture in the Indo-Pacific. This, in turn, could pose serious security threats to India from Chinese penetration in its neighbourhood, BRI expansion, construction of dual-use infrastructure and use of grey-zone warfare tactics.

Further, the American attempt to create coercive deterrence in the region through the agreement will only reinforces the ongoing Western consolidation in the Arctic. In addition, the heightened tensions between Europe and Russia amidst the ongoing Ukraine conflict have already intensified the securitisation of Arctic geopolitics. NATO’s launch of Arctic Sentry in February 2026, has brought allied exercises and capabilities into an overarching Arctic security architecture. These developments, alongside the Western sanctions regime, could further increase cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. The last thing India would want is a weakened Russia that becomes a junior partner to China. Naturally, such an asymmetric dynamic generates acute strategic vulnerabilities for New Delhi, given its already tense and complex ties with Beijing.

Moreover, the geopolitical fragmentation of the Arctic, with the US/European NATO allies on its western flank and Russia (alongside China) on its eastern flank, could further constrain New Delhi’s partnership with Moscow due to American and European backlash. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 that allows the US President to levy up to 100 per cent tariffs on major buyers of Russian oil and European sanctions on Indian entities for trading with Russia demonstrate this possibility.

On the connectivity front, new shipping lanes in the Arctic like the Northern Sea Route (NSR) may help India de-risk its dependence on traditional chokepoints like the Suez Canal. India’s interest in the NSR also hinges on developing the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, which promises to reduce India-Europe travel time by two weeks. Additionally, the NSR can facilitate energy and mineral shipments from Russia’s Arctic to India and create opportunities in shipbuilding, ship repair, polar navigation and seafarer training, and eventually connect with wider Russian transport networks. However, the Greenland agreement, by creating a more militarised and bifurcated Arctic, could make India’s Russia-based connectivity plans harder through sanctions, financing restrictions, technology controls and political pressure.

India will also have to factor in the risks of climate change, which will be exacerbated by resource extraction, infrastructure creation, militarisation and rising shipping activities in the region. Reports have already linked the shift in monsoon dynamics to Arctic warming, which, in turn, will have implications for food and water security as well as economic growth in India. Also, Greenland ice sheet melting could raise sea levels, posing threats of coastal submergence and other disasters in the Indian subcontinent.

As the Arctic becomes a theatre for geopolitics and great-power competition, India can no longer view it through the prism of scientific research or environmental effects alone. The geopolitical power games in the region can have profound implications for India’s national security, economic growth, energy security, supply chain resilience, technological progress, trade and disaster management. Though it has limited institutional leverage over the Arctic states, India must nevertheless stress the need to ensure sustainable resource management, climate resilience, sustainable shipping and preservation of the fragile region for shared human progress. As the parliamentary panel on External Affairs recommends, India should also pursue recognition of the Arctic as a “Quasi-Global Commons”.

The real question for India, then, is not whether it can stop great-power rivalry in the Arctic, but whether it can assert its strategic autonomy to further its national interests amid increasingly fragmented geopolitics in the region. This requires India to maintain a nuanced equilibrium between Washington and its Western partners on one side and Moscow on the other, counterbalancing Beijing’s rise in the process. And in this lies the true litmus test for Indian diplomacy.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.