“China Is What We See in Ourselves”: David McCourt on the West’s Shift from Engagement to Strategic Competition

After decades of optimism about China’s integration into the international order, policymakers in Washington, Canberra, and London have increasingly come to view China as a long-term strategic competitor. In his latest book, The Dragon Defined: How Washington, Canberra, and London Reimagined China (Oxford University Press, 2026), prominent political sociologist, David McCourt argues that this transformation was not simply a reaction to China’s rise, but the product of “hegemonic field effect” – a political and ideological alignment across the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. In this exclusive interview with TSI, McCourt discusses the intellectual origins of the book, the transition from engagement to strategic competition, the future of AUKUS, the impact of Donald Trump and the broader implications of his research for understanding contemporary US-China relations.

TSI - What inspired you to develop the concept of ‘hegemonic field effects’, and how does it improve upon existing theories of American hegemony?

David McCourt - Typical theories of American hegemony take two forms. A first uses the term essentially as synonymous with “big power” (see Keohane, for example). Hegemony is the ability to control others, often more consensually than a term like “empire” (which suggests direct occupation) or “great power”. A second approach deals more squarely with the issue of consent, which draws from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. The problem with both of these ways of thinking about hegemony is that they tend to see power as mechanistic, with countries under the hegemon’s sway as automatically doing what they’re told. That is not at all what you see when it comes to China policy in Britain and Australia, or elsewhere, like Japan or Indonesia. I like “hegemonic field effects” because it sees hegemons and their subordinate states as being in a flexible fielded relationship or struggle, in the terms of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The US hegemon itself is a field that needs to be analysed, since there are internal disagreements (“palace wars”) over what China means in Washington. The aim of the book is to see how struggles over the meaning of China within the US and across the connections between Washington, Canberra, and London, resulted in a contingent alignment on a competition framing of the PRC across the three capitals.

TSI - Based on your interviews, what was the most surprising insight you gained about how policymakers perceive China?

David McCourt - In the book I call China (following an interviewee) “the world’s biggest Rorschach Test: the more you look at it, the more you see yourself.” The most surprising thing to me was how true this is. What China is really depends on how elites in Washington, Canberra, and London see their own countries, which is also shaped by the culture and politics of the cities themselves. From Washington, China is a military-security issue, which is not the case for say New York or San Francisco. China is something different in Canberra, because in Australia the issue of China is a matter of national identity (who Australia is) as much a matter of national interest. Finally, China is not one clear thing in Britain because, post-Brexit, elites in Britain are still trying to figure out what Britain is in the world.

TSI - Why did you choose the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom as your comparative cases, rather than including other American allies such as Japan or South Korea?

David McCourt - I must say this was due to a long-standing research interest in the UK (where I’m from) and a sense that Australia was key to Washington’s own shift on China. Japan, South Korea, or many other states (India, Indonesia, etc) would have been very useful to cover. I really hope others will do this work.

TSI - To what extent do you think the shift from ‘Engagement’ to ‘Strategic Competition’ was driven by changing ideas rather than China's own actions?

David McCourt- I stress in the book the processes through which changing meanings of China’s actions were made sense of. China has changed, of that we can be sure. Post the Beijing Olympics of Xi Jinping’s leadership, all signs point to a more assertive Beijing. But ideas never simply translate into policy shifts. I am interested in the partial alignment across Washington, Canberra, and London on China that occurred since approximately 2016.

TSI - Do you believe AUKUS represents a lasting strategic realignment or could future political changes reverse this trend?

David McCourt - I would be surprised if the alignment on China between the three countries fundamentally shifts. I do not see a return to something like Engagement or the “Golden Era” in Britain and Australia. Yet I also think that changes in warfare made evident in automated technologies in use in the Iran conflict and that between Russia and the Ukraine might well render the centre-piece of AUKUS – the nuclear-powered submarines – look already very old-fashioned. We may well never see those boats.

TSI - With the return of Donald Trump to the White House, do you expect the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom to remain aligned on China policy or could their approaches diverge?

David McCourt - I had to draft a post-script to the book as Trump entered office, since he is such a consequential figure the material I cover seems like ancient history! But I think beneath Trump, the alignment on strategic competition among advisers, officials, and think tankers is quite strong. I think we see Australia and Britain moving away from Washington for now, which will slow down efforts to stand up to Beijing and lead to some attempts at re-engagement, as we have seen with visits from high-ranking British and Australian leaders over the past year or so. But still, the hegemonic field – i.e. the connections between Washington, Canberra, and London – remain strong, and I would expect the partial alignment on China to continue until Trump leaves office.

TSI - What key lesson should scholars and policymakers take away from The Dragon Defined when analysing the contemporary US-China competitive relationship?

David McCourt - While I try to avoid direct policy advice, I would say that scholars and policymakers can take away from The Dragon Defined a more accurate account of how we got to where we are on China in Washington, Canberra, and London. While China has changed, as mentioned, the shift from engagement to competition was not inevitable. People sometimes ask whether the change is a “good thing.” That’s not for me to decide! What I hope to have done is offer a clearer explanation that stems, at least in part, from Socrates’ famous advice to “know thyself.” What China is is also in part what the United States, Australia, and Britain “are.”

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.