BRICS in Transition: When Expansion Tests Unity

Summary

The 2026 BRICS New Delhi summit exposed deep divisions, as Iran-UAE tensions over the Israel-Iran conflict flared. While rapid expansion has increased the group’s geopolitical weight, it has fractured unity—turning a development platform into a fragmented diplomatic arena where India must balance rivalries.

The foreign ministers of the BRICS group met in the month of May in New Delhi, where everything from resilience to sustainability to innovation to cooperation dominated their conversation. The meeting signified a whole new era of diplomacy between these countries. However, there was a harsh reality under all the diplomatic discourse and political manoeuvring. This expanded group of BRICS is not only one of wounded emerging powers but also the arena in which the unfinished business of the post-American world is playing out.

It could not be an administrative mistake for the group not to have issued their joint statement. What came instead was a slimmer version of it, namely the chair’s statement, which had the ability of maintaining consistency in the process without disregarding the fissures in its substance. The immediate reason was the US-Israeli conflict against Iran, but deeper was the problem that BRICS has grown faster than it has mingled. It has gained geopolitical weight but no unity.

The Iranian delegation came to New Delhi looking for something more than just sympathy. What the Iranians wanted was to reshape BRICS itself. It was the objective of the country’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, to change the character of BRICS from that of a development bloc to one of a shield against Western influence. The argument was made through appeals to principles of sovereignty and multi-polarity. Iran wanted that Washington should be condemned and Tel Aviv should be criticised, hoping to turn the concept of multi-polarity into the political doctrine of solidarity. If one of the BRICS countries can be coerced by force without any reaction from the others, then what does it say about BRICS’ purported role in international politics?

However, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had its own perception on this crisis. For the UAE, the challenge is not about civilisational resistance to Western hegemony, but about protecting its ports, tankers, energy facilities and financial systems. For Gulf monarchies, ideological issues play a minor role compared to their vulnerable position geographically. Iranian attacks, problems with Hormuz and attacks on maritime facilities are not abstract threats but an urgent matter for political and diplomatic calculation. Araghchi’s statements about the complicity of the UAE in attacking Iran shattered the myth of solidarity among BRICS nations.

It was not just a dispute between two member countries. Rather, it brought out the inherent paradox of BRICS enlargement. On the one hand, the grouping considers itself to be the voice of the Global South, but on the other, some of its member countries are rivals in their region, possessing rival strategic doctrines and concepts of international order.

There is historical irony here. The initial BRICS came at a time when economic grievances against Western financial supremacy still had the potential to generate widespread political unity. Those were the kinds of issues that could be considered with the IMF, development finance and trade asymmetries. And these issues did not involve placing fundamental security concerns in subordinate positions. However, these countries are now caught up in real regional competition from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa, as part of the growing BRICS.

In this sense BRICS is becoming more like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at its most functional: not one of similar interests but a diplomatic tool to avoid strategic division among unequal and suspicious states. Its language is often vague because vagueness is the price of coexistence.

In this context, the role of India was particularly important. New Delhi did not buckle under pressure to make BRICS a platform against the West and kept political space for consensus to remain intact. This was a strategic balancing act. India knows that institutional strength is the bigger issue for the future of BRICS than rhetorical inflexibility. India sought to influence the course of discussions in a direction that focused on development finance, technological cooperation, supply chains and multilateral reform with the goal of ensuring that the organisation did not become entrapped in the sectarian logic of Middle Eastern rivalries.

However, what the critics would say is that India’s relations with the US have become too entangled to its relations with Israel and the UAE, which could affect India’s strategic independence and role as a leader within the developing world. It may appear justified since the moral vocabulary, whose influence gives the real power to foreign policy, can be compromised when the diplomatic approach is excessively motivated by economic interests. But on the other side, the romantic ideologism devoid of materialistic concerns is also just as perilous.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.