Indonesia’s Balancing Act Between Islam and International Responsibility
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Summary
President Prabowo Subianto balances Indonesia’s Islamic solidarity with Palestine and its global responsibilities by backing a two-state solution and peacekeeping. Backed by key Islamic organisations, this pragmatic approach frames humanitarian aid as both a moral and anti-colonial duty.
President Prabowo Subianto has managed to walk a fine line between Islamic solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza and Indonesia’s image as a responsible international actor on the global stage. In his debut address to the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 2025, he reaffirmed Indonesia’s support for a two state solution and Palestinian statehood. He also declared that Indonesia would ‘support all guarantees for the security of Israel’. This was a controversial statement for a country that has no diplomatic ties with Israel and caused a stir in Indonesia. But Prabowo has managed to pacify his opponents and leverage his track record of support for Palestinian statehood in the context of responsible foreign policy and reinforcing Indonesia as a good global citizen.
In the same speech, Prabowo moved beyond rhetoric and pledged that Indonesia was prepared to deploy up to 20,000 peacekeepers, signalling Indonesia’s commitment to the UN mandate of peace and security. That pledge builds on Indonesia’s humanitarian track record that Prabowo expanded in his role as defence minister. In June 2024, when Prabowo was defence minister, he announced that President Joko Widodo had instructed him to send Indonesian medical personnel to Gaza and establish a field hospital in cooperation with partners in the Middle East, particularly the United Arab Emirates. Indonesian medical teams were subsequently deployed to work alongside Emirati run facilities in Rafah, treating tens of thousands of patients and performing thousands of surgeries. After taking office, Prabowo publicly thanked UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan for cooperation in establishing a joint field hospital in Gaza, framing the initiative as part of Indonesia’s contribution to humanitarian aid.
Prabowo presents Indonesia as a Muslim majority country that maintains a focus on ‘human solidarity’ and responsible statecraft. In his speeches on Gaza and Palestine, he condemns the ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ and violence against civilians, while linking Indonesia’s position to its own historical experience of colonial oppression and injustice. This support for Palestine is framed as part of a broader moral responsibility that is rooted in Indonesia’s history of colonialisation.
Islamic actors in Indonesia see the plight of Palestinians in Gaza as a litmus test for the Indonesian state. Their reactions to Prabowo illustrate how Islam provides the framework within which the government must act, even if it does not make direct references to Islam or religious solidarity.
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as leading civil society Muslim organisations (collectively influencing well over 100 million Indonesians) play a central role in shaping religious discourse and public opinion. They have raised the Palestinian plight as a matter of grave concern, deserving of Indonesia’s response. This position has been reiterated in numerous public rallies calling on Israel to ends it war on Gaza in 2024 and 2025. No government could ignore this.
NU and Muhammadiyah leaders have framed Palestine as a central concern for Indonesia’s foreign policy. This is more than sympathy for an oppressed Muslim community. Support for Palestinian self determination and condemnation of Israel’s disproportionate military action in Gaza are not optional; they are part of what it means for Indonesia to live up to its Islamic and anti colonial heritage.
At the same time, concern for Palestinians is reconciled with President Prabowo’s pragmatism. After Prabowo endorsed the US-led Board of Peace to oversee the reconstruction of Gaza, Hajj Yahya Staquf (chairman of NU), welcomed the prospects of bringing ‘tangible results for Palestinians’. Muhammadiyah leader Anwar Abbas was more outspoken on this point. He expressed concern that joining the Board of Peace could signal a dilution of Indonesia’s commitment to Palestinian sovereignty under Prabowo’s leadership. He warned that sitting alongside President Donald Trump in such a council could be detrimental to the Palestinian statehood cause, even as he acknowledged that Prabowo had remained consistent in his support for Palestinian independence. Muhammadiyah accepted that Indonesia should participate in international efforts to end the war and manage post conflict reconstruction, but insisted that such participation must be scrutinised through a Palestine first lens.
Reactions to Prabowo’s approach to Gaza show that Islam remains a structuring force in Indonesian foreign policy. It is not a decorative afterthought. Prabowo’s offer of peacekeepers, his embrace of joint field hospitals in Gaza, and his insistence on a two state solution that guarantees both Palestinian independence and Israeli security signal a desire to recast Indonesia as a good global citizen without abandoning its long standing commitment to Palestine. Yet the scope for manoeuvre is set, above all, by Islamic actors at home. NU, Muhammadiyah, and a wider constellation of Islamic organisations define what counts as an acceptable position. They press the government to keep Palestine at the centre of its moral compass. They also test pragmatic engagement with Western led initiatives. In this context, Gaza is not just a foreign crisis but a mirror: it reflects the limits of how far a president can shift Indonesia’s diplomatic posture while sustaining his balancing act between Islam and international responsibility.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.