Partnerships As Power: European Union Relational Geopolitics And Why This Matters For India

In January 2026, the European Union and India concluded negotiations on a free trade agreement and signed a Security and Defence Partnership. These agreements mark a new phase in a relationship built over decades. They also reflect a wider change in how the EU pursues geopolitical goals in moments of international turbulence by building partnerships that connect trade, technology, security and shared rules.

The EU’s geopolitical role is often assessed against the model of a state: can it command military power, speak with one voice, or act quickly in a crisis? And yet the EU is not a state. So how can it shape the choices available to others through the relationships it builds? The concept of relational geopolitics helps answer these questions. EU power takes shape through interaction. It depends on the ties that link actors, the resources and rules those ties organise, and the ways partners use or contest them. It shows how a relationship changes the EU and its partners over time. Partnerships can also serve a classic geopolitical goal: deterrence. Cooperation that strengthens partners’ capacity to resist coercion and coordinate a response can change an aggressor’s calculation of what it might gain and at what cost.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, followed by US threats to withdraw security guarantees to Europe, the EU has expanded its network of security and defence partnerships. It has signed agreements with Norway, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Canada, among others. These frameworks cover areas such as maritime security, cyber threats, crisis management and defence industry cooperation. The EU has also advanced trade agreements with partners including MERCOSUR, Australia, New Zealand. Many of these initiatives began before the war, but the EU now places them within a wider effort to strengthen its security and economic resilience. Their terms differ because each partner brings distinct interests and capabilities.

India makes this approach especially clear. Russia’s war is central to the EU’s security agenda, yet it remains a point of disagreement with New Delhi. India has maintained its own position, including abstentions in UN votes on the invasion. The EU has said it will continue to engage India on all aspects of the war. Meanwhile, both sides have expanded cooperation in areas where their interests overlap.

That cooperation has acquired a more substantial institutional basis. The EU and India agreed in 2021 to resume trade negotiations and formally relaunched them in June 2022. In April 2022, they announced the Trade and Technology Council, which brings trade, technology and security officials into regular contact. Its working groups address digital governance, connectivity and strategic technologies, including artificial intelligence and semiconductors. The forum gives both sides a way to negotiate common priorities as technology and economic security become more closely connected.

The economic relationship is substantial. EU–India trade in goods reached €118 billion in 2025, while trade in services reached €67 billion in 2024. The EU’s investment stock in India rose from €105 billion in 2021 to almost €133 billion in 2024. (The free trade agreement concluded in January 2026 still requires signature and ratification before it takes effect.) At the same summit, the two sides signed a Security and Defence Partnership covering maritime security, cyber issues, counterterrorism, space and defence industry cooperation.

The political differences in the EU-India partnership exemplify what relational means. The EU brings market access, regulatory influence and institutional resources. India brings its own priorities, bargaining power and capacity to accept, adapt or reject proposals. Their resources are unequal, but Brussels cannot determine the outcome alone. Indian choices shape which areas of cooperation advance and on what terms.

These partnerships also serve a classic geopolitical goal: deterrence. India and the EU share an interest in preventing Chinese dominance of the Indo-Pacific, particularly its sea lanes, technologies and supply chains. For India, that concern is immediate. For the EU, cooperation with India builds a capacity to act beyond Europe while it confronts Russian aggression, US economic pressure and uncertainty over American security commitments. Maritime cooperation, cyber defence and diversified supply chains can make both partners harder to coerce. India helps decide which capabilities they develop together and how far cooperation goes. Their deterrent effect therefore depends on the relationship they build, even as their views of other threats differ.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.