Why the Xi–Trump Summit Shocked Japan
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During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in September, the United States and China were described as allies during the Second World War. This provoked an uproar in Japan. Major media outlets and numerous commentators, including international relations scholars, protested that Washington had succumbed to Beijing’s interpretation of history and that Japan had suffered a diplomatic defeat.
Many right-wing commentators argued that, because the People’s Republic of China did not exist during the Second World War, the historical understanding expressed in the joint statement—that China and the United States had been allies—was incorrect. Influenced by such arguments, major media outlets also suggested that even describing the two countries as wartime allies revealed the “danger” of Washington adopting an increasingly pro-Beijing interpretation of history.
That the United States and China were allies during the Second World War is, of course, an objective historical fact. Admittedly, China’s internationally recognised government at the time was the Kuomintang-led government of the Republic of China. Yet the Chinese Communist Party also participated in the resistance against Japan through its united front with the Kuomintang, notwithstanding the antagonism between them. Moreover, the vast majority of countries, including the United States and Japan, recognise the government of the People’s Republic of China as the government representing China, in accordance with their respective “one China” policies. It would be incorrect to say that “the United States and the People’s Republic of China were allies.” It is correct, however, to say that “the United States and China were allies.”
Since China’s emergence as a superpower, Japan has struggled to come to terms with its enormous presence. Relations with China have deteriorated particularly sharply and visibly since the Takaichi administration took office. The immediate trigger was Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks during parliamentary questioning, to the effect that Japan’s Self-Defence Forces would be deployed to assist U.S. forces in the event of a Taiwan contingency. China reacted fiercely and continues to restrict rare-earth exports to Japan in retaliation for her remarks.
Under these circumstances, Japan’s relationship with the United States assumes even greater importance. Japan is approaching the final stage of its effort to double the defence spending within five years, and there is strong support within the Takaichi administration for further increases. The immediate catalyst for this substantial expansion was the profound anxiety that the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war generated among the Japanese public. In practice, however, government officials and commentators have repeatedly emphasised the military threat posed by China’s emergence as a superpower. Yet even a sustained and considerable Japanese effort to increase defense spending would not enable Japan to confront China on its own. It would have to do so alongside the United States. The deeper Japan’s confrontation with China becomes, therefore, the stronger its desire to rely heavily on the U.S. alliance. Paradoxically, Japan’s substantial defense buildup, through the pronounced Chinese opposition it has elicited, has reinforced Japan’s sense of dependence on the United States.
The Xi–Trump summit came as such a shock to the Takaichi administration and right-wing commentators because a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, at a time of deepening confrontation between Tokyo and Beijing, could leave Japan isolated. This, too, is a curious phenomenon in some respects. Precisely because Japan occupies a geographical position between the two superpowers, the United States and China, the desire to contain China by strengthening the U.S. alliance has grown ever stronger.
Against this background, some Japanese commentators focused on an episode involving the National Archives in Washington, which the U.S. and Chinese leaders visited. According to this account, the U.S. side had intended to display the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but the display was dropped following Chinese objections. These commentators saw the episode as evidence of a divergence between Washington and Beijing. Right-wing commentators and politicians in Japan consequently began arguing that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was the very foundation of the regional order in East Asia and that now was the time to assert this point against China.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty does not specify to whom Taiwan and the Penghu Islands belong. Some on the Japanese right, who quietly hope for Taiwanese independence, appear to believe that this omission could provide a basis for regarding these territories as an independent state.
Similarly, because the treaty does not stipulate Japan’s renunciation of the “Senkaku Islands”, known as the “Diaoyu Islands” in China and the “Diaoyutai Islands” in Taiwan, some on the Japanese right appear eager to argue that it definitively establishes Japanese sovereignty over the islands under international law.
Article 2(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty provides: “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.” As a peace treaty intended to end the state of war and the occupation following the conflict between Japan and the Allied powers, it clarified Japan’s renunciation of sovereignty over former possessions regarded as colonies acquired through external wars and other means, rather than as part of Japan’s original territory. It did not, however, specify to whom those territories would belong.
A defining feature of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was that neither the Soviet Union nor China, both major wartime Allied powers, became parties to it. The Korean War had already broken out the previous year, and Cold War divisions were firmly in place. The Soviet Union attended the peace conference but did not sign the treaty; neither the Republic of China nor the People’s Republic of China was invited. The treaty therefore left unspecified to whom Taiwan and the Penghu Islands would belong.
The natural expectation would have been for the peace treaty to stipulate their restoration to the Republic of China, as expressly stated in the Cairo Declaration issued after the 1943 meeting of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of China’s National Government. By then, however, the People’s Republic of China had been established in 1949, while Taiwan and the Penghu Islands remained under the administration of the Republic of China government. In these circumstances, neither government was invited to the San Francisco peace conference.
Among the major powers of the Second World War, the Soviet Union, which did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, had recognised the People’s Republic of China. So, too, had the United Kingdom, which participated in the conference and signed the treaty. Norway, the Netherlands, Ceylon—now Sri Lanka—Pakistan, and Indonesia had also recognised the People’s Republic. Thus, six of the treaty’s 48 signatories other than Japan had already recognised the government in Beijing. Poland and Czechoslovakia, which attended the conference alongside the Soviet Union but did not sign the treaty, had likewise recognised the People’s Republic.
By contrast, the other 42 signatories, including the United States and France, had not recognised the People’s Republic of China. Washington and Paris continued to recognise the Republic of China government.
The signatories were therefore divided over which government—the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China—legitimately represented China. Faced with this division, they stipulated only Japan’s renunciation of sovereignty, leaving the recipient unspecified.
Yet paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, which Japan accepted at the end of the Second World War, required the implementation of the Cairo Declaration. The San Francisco Peace Treaty rested on the understanding that Japan had fulfilled the terms of the Potsdam Declaration over the course of the occupation. It would therefore be difficult to argue that the San Francisco Peace Treaty created an entirely new situation irrespective of the Cairo Declaration. What had emerged was a dispute between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China.
Article 2 of the peace treaty that Japan concluded with the Republic of China in 1952 acknowledged Japan’s renunciation of its rights to Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and other territories under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, when Japan normalised diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China through the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communiqué, the Japanese government stated that the 1952 treaty had lost its significance and was regarded as having terminated. Questions concerning recognition of the government representing China and the postwar settlement were thus not resolved by the San Francisco Peace Treaty alone. They continued to evolve within the international politics surrounding “one China.”
If the Japanese right seeks to attribute excessive significance to the San Francisco Peace Treaty in territorial matters, it will therefore inevitably intensify tensions between Japan and China.
The Republic of China government currently based in Taiwan has not formally declared the establishment of a new state called the “Republic of Taiwan,” although it maintains that “the Republic of China (Taiwan) is a sovereign and independent state.” Avoiding a declaration of independence that would signify the establishment of such a new state remains one of the precarious means of limiting the risk of military confrontation with mainland China.
Nor is the People’s Republic of China the only government claiming sovereignty over the “Senkaku Islands”, or “Diaoyu Islands”, or “Diaoyutai Islands”. The Republic of China on Taiwan also claims them. Neither government was a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and neither is automatically bound by it. Moreover, neither currently recognises Japanese sovereignty over the islands. It is therefore impossible to maintain that the San Francisco Peace Treaty alone resolves the question of sovereignty over the islands.
Relations between China and Japan have deteriorated severely. Historical interpretation has long been a sensitive issue between the two countries. Their worsening relationship may now be fostering an atmosphere on both sides in which calm, reasoned debate is increasingly unwelcome. That is a deeply dangerous sign.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.