What are the main causes of democratic erosion in Europe?

What are the main causes of democratic erosion in Europe? Before I address the causes of democratic erosion, let me first address the extent of democratic erosion in Europe. Starting in 2010, we note an erosion of democracy in Southern and Eastern Europe. Importantly, however, the development of democracy varied across countries, reflecting each country’s specific political development.

Changes in government can be highly consequential for the quality of democracy in a given country. This means that election outcomes can decisively reinforce or undermine the quality of liberal democracy in each country. Governments can shape the rules of the democratic regime in critical ways. If you rely on V-Dem data, democratic erosion in Europe has been rather limited, even in the two more affected regions, focused mainly on two cases: Hungary and Poland. There has also been some erosion in Greece and Slovenia, but the main cases are Hungary and Poland.

So, the question becomes a different one: what are the main causes of democratic erosion in Hungary and Poland? For these two cases, I take my cues from Larry Bartels: Democracies erode from the top. The main reason for the erosion of democracy in these two countries is that illiberal party leaders gained power undividedly, due to institutional rules (a highly disproportionate electoral system in both countries, combined with a single-chamber parliament in Hungary), political scandals (both countries), and an economic crisis (Hungary). In Hungary, the illiberal leaders gained a supermajority, allowing them to change the constitution and more. In Poland, their situation was more constrained, but they still found ways to change the institutional rules in their favor.

Having said this, the voters cannot be entirely absolved. Originally, they voted for the conservative opposition in largely bipolar party systems. In subsequent elections, however, they confirmed the illiberal incumbents (once in Poland, three times in Hungary). Partisanship played a role in these subsequent elections, i.e., partisan voters weighed their own side’s electoral success higher than its violations of democratic rules. They were also kept in line by favourable social policies (mainly in Poland) and electoral bribes (in Hungary). The opposition’s failure to build a viable electoral coalition also contributed to the confirmation of illiberal rulers. But note that, eventually, in both countries, voters fulfilled their role as the ultimate arbiters of democracy.

To what extent can we blame the transformation of the political conflict and the emergence of a new cleavage (in the singular) for the democratic erosion? You can infer from my answer to the first question that I do not think the transformation of the political conflict is to blame for this erosion. The drivers of the new cleavage between cosmopolitans and nationalists are radical-right populists.

Many observers attribute the erosion of democracy to the populism of the radical right. I don’t think this is appropriate, even if the Hungarian and Polish illiberal governments represent this political camp. The populists are not by definition anti-democratic. As a matter of fact, they believe they are more democratic than everyone else; they just have a very majoritarian and illiberal view of democracy. Moreover, their populism is secondary to their substantive message, which opposes immigration and defends the nation-state in an ever more integrated world. As their substantive message falls on ever more fertile ground, they increasingly become an integral part of the national party systems in Europe, and their populism becomes ever more secondary. If they get into government in a coalition with other center-right parties, they moderate and become more mainstream. Italy is an exemplary case. If they fail to moderate, they are punished at the polls. The Netherlands is an exemplary case.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.