Israel and Türkiye: Primed for Conflict?

The deadly attacks launched by Hamas on Israel on 7 October 2023 have triggered a full blown regional war. Less noticed has been the deepening crisis between Israel and Türkiye in the wake of the conflict. Reflecting the low point of the relations, President Erdogan on 10 June 2026 stated that ‘Israel's "aggression" posed a ‌threat to the whole world and must be stopped’. A month later the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, launched a scathing attack against the planned sale of F-35 fighter jets by the US to Türkiye. Netanyahu argued that the sale ‘would destroy the power balance in the Middle East because Türkiye has aggressive aspirations’ and that President Erdogan threatens to destroy ‘my country, the one and only Jewish State’.

The deepening tensions between Israel and Türkiye represent a sharp departure from the strategic alliance the two states developed during the decade of the 1990s, which is widely considered as the ‘golden age’ of Israeli-Turkish relations. During this period the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) trained in Turkey, which purchased Israeli arms to bolster its own defence. Bilateral economic ties expanded whilst the two states leveraged their improved ties to bolster their status as key post-Cold War US allies. So why have relations decline so sharply since? Domestic political changes in Israel and Turkey are one explanation. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has undergone autocratisation and centralisation of power, including weakening the formerly influential military, the principal driver of the strategic alliance with Israel. This shift has been accompanied by an increasingly Islamist-oriented foreign policy that is highly critical of Israel, particularly regarding the Palestinians. This was reflected in President Erdogan's statement during the 7 October war that Israel was conducting massacres that would ‘make the Nazis jealous’.

A similar domestic shift towards centralisation has taken place in Israel as Prime Minister Netanyahu has concentrated an increasing amount of power in his own hands since being elected in 2009. Apart from remaining the sole point of continuity in the Israeli top security-political brass since then, his current government has presided over a judicial overhaul aimed at weakening the judicial branch’s ability to check the executive branch. Concurrently, Netanyahu’s foreign policy has been increasingly determined by the nationalist-religious agenda driven by his extreme nationalist-religious coalition partners: the ‘Jewish Power’ and ‘Religious-Zionism parties.

The impact of these domestic changes has been compounded by increasing regional friction over the past decade and a half. In 2010 the IDF intercepted the Mavi Marmara flotilla in international waters as it was en route to the Gaza Strip. As Israeli naval commandos used lethal force to board the vessels, claiming the activists used life-threatening resistance tactics—which the activists denied—nine Turkish citizens were killed. Shortly afterwards, as the then US Secretary of State recalled in her memoirs, ‘Foreign Minister Davutoglu came to see me, and we talked for more than two hours. He was highly emotional and threatened that Turkey might declare war on Israel’. The potential friction intensified as Israel forged a military-diplomatic alliance with Cyprus and Greece to balance against Turkey in response to the deterioration of the relations between Jerusalem and Ankara, an alliance branded the Mediterranean Arc.

However, tensions peaked following the eruption of the 7 October war. The Israeli and Turkish ambassadors have been recalled and Turkey announced it is suspending all trade with Israel in May 2024, citing the humanitarian situation in Gaza. However, the most significant increase in the risk of military confrontation followed the toppling of the former Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, in December 2024 by Turkish-backed forces of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Syria's current president, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The ensuing expanding presence of Israel and Turkey in Syria created potential flashpoints that could produce a military clash through accident or miscalculation, rather than deliberate escalation. These include an Israeli airstrike accidentally hitting a site where Turkish personnel are present or clashes involving Turkish-backed Syrian forces where Israel is operating.

However, despite the increasingly inflammatory rhetoric deployed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Erdogan, the deepening political and economic crisis between Ankara and Jerusalem, and the potential for a military clash in Syria, conflict can and should be averted. Israel is already engaged on multiple fronts and has little incentive to open another, while Türkiye's regional commitments stretch from Somalia through Syria to Azerbaijan. A conflict with Israel would overstretch its capacities. Direct conflict therefore runs strongly against the interests of both sides. In addition, the US retains significant leverage over both Israel and Türkiye and is likely to encourage de-escalation. Finally, recognising the inherent risks, the Israeli and Turkish militaries have established communication channels to prevent unintended clashes. Both states and their allies should remain laser-focused on avoiding conflict, as rapprochement, let alone a return to the Golden Age, appears unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.