Navigating Multipolarity: India’s Strategic Interests in an Evolving BRICS

BRICS has transformed over the past 15 years from a loose economic concept into a vital forum for emerging powers demanding a stronger say in global governance. With the necessity for strategic partnerships growing increasingly urgent, the 2026 New Delhi summit unfolded amid significant geopolitical flux, defined by conflicts in West Asia, volatile energy markets, and intensifying great-power competition. Seen from India’s perspective, Russia and China remain notable member players.

Russia remains one of the more distinctive pillars of India’s external relationships and a central actor inside BRICS. The bilateral partnership is rooted in a long history of diplomatic and institutional support. Within BRICS, Russia brings energy resources, defence technology, diplomatic weight, and a willingness to challenge Western institutional dominance. These assets complement India’s own priorities. Russian crude has helped cushion India against price spikes and supply disruptions; defence cooperation continues to underpin operational readiness even as India diversifies suppliers; and Moscow’s advocacy for greater use of national currencies and alternative payment systems aligns with New Delhi’s interest in reducing dollar dependence.

Yet the relationship is not without constraints. Russia’s deepening ties with China and its preoccupation with the European theatre limit the bandwidth Moscow can extend in South Asia. India has therefore treated the partnership as a valuable but not exclusive pillar of its strategic autonomy. In the BRICS context this translates into support for practical cooperation—on energy, connectivity, and institutional reform—while resisting any attempt to turn the grouping into an anti-Western alliance.

In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow has tilted more towards Beijing, especially for trade and defence technology. This growing engagement with China presents a sharper dilemma. In case of India-China relations, the border dispute, competitive infrastructure initiatives, and competing interests in South Asia create friction that cannot be wished away. At the same time, the two countries share concrete interests inside BRICS. Both favour a multipolar international system, greater representation for the Global South in international financial institutions, and mechanisms that reduce vulnerability to unilateral sanctions or dollar volatility. Discussions on local-currency settlement, digital payment systems, and climate-related financing open further avenues for cooperation that do not require resolution of territorial differences.

There remains a concern that Beijing may try to harden BRICS into a more cohesive counterweight to Western institutions, promote the internationalisation of the Renminbi, and shape the grouping’s external posture. India’s interest lies in keeping the agenda functional rather than ideological. Cooperation on disaster management, climate monitoring, supply-chain resilience, and technological standards can proceed without accepting hierarchical leadership or political alignment.

A more durable approach focuses on the entire energy value chain rather than the wellhead alone. Securing supplies at the right price, in the right location, and at the right time requires diversified import sources, strategic petroleum reserves, efficient refining and distribution infrastructure, and accelerated investment in renewables, storage and grid modernisation. BRICS can play a constructive role here. Member states control significant hydrocarbon reserves and are simultaneously investing in clean-energy technologies. Joint work on energy efficiency standards, critical-mineral supply chains, and financing for just transitions can reduce collective vulnerability. The grouping’s value lies less in grand declarations than in concrete projects that improve energy access and affordability for large populations.

Moving ahead, BRICS should remain a flexible platform for issue-based cooperation among major non-Western economies. It should not become an ideological bloc or a vehicle for any single member’s hegemony. India’s contribution lies in insisting on practical outcomes, transparent institutions, and respect for diverse national paths.

For India, the test is whether engagement inside BRICS enhances rather than constrains its ability to pursue independent relationships and domestic priorities. In a world of contested multipolarity, that capacity for calibrated, interest-driven cooperation remains the most valuable strategic asset.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.