Populism and the erosion of democracy in Europe

The term populism refers to a “thin” ideology that can be defined as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups – ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”. This definition includes the existence of two homogenous groups – ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, the antagonistic relationship between the two, the idea of popular sovereignty, and the positive valorization of ‘the people’ combined with the denigration of ‘the elite’. Most importantly, populism has a monolithic conception of the people. The people are always conceived as a homogeneous category, a unity, a corporate body capable of having common interests and a common will – a volonté générale.

For populists, the people are paramount. But, given the diverse interpretations of “the people,” it is impossible to arrive at a clear-cut definition of the phenomenon without giving “the people” a more specific meaning. Populism’s meaning varies with the understanding of “the people,” i.e., the idealized conception of the community (the “heartland”) to which it applies. It is precisely for this reason that populism is a “thin” ideology, which needs to be associated with more substantive ideologies to become a “thick” ideology. We can identify at least two conceptions of “the people” – a cultural one (the people as a nation), and an economic one (the people as a social class). The notion of the people as a nation is typically associated with right-wing populism, while the notion of the people as a social class (the downtrodden, which stands for the people as a whole) is characteristic of left-wing populism. In Europe, the rise of populists from the radical right has been far more significant than the rise of those from the radical left. The rise of the latter has been confined to Southern Europe during the Eurozone crisis 2008-2015.

To understand why there is not necessarily an inherent link between populism and the erosion of democracy, we need to recognize that the “thin” ideology of populism is a secondary phenomenon compared to the “thick” host ideology to which it is linked. The “thick” host ideology of the populists, in turn, is the result of profound social transformations we can expect to be decisive in shaping party systems in the long run. Thus, in Europe, more specifically, the rise of the populist radical right, or of its equivalent, national conservative parties, is the result of such social transformations. We need to fully understand these transformations to assess the threat to democracy posed by the rise of these new challengers.

In fact, the new challengers of the populist radical right, or the transformed national conservative parties that succeed in outcompeting them, are establishing themselves as one of the two opposing camps that express a new structural conflict, the so-called “new cleavage” between nationalists and cosmopolitans, which is currently restructuring the European party systems. In this restructuring process, European party systems have become increasingly polarized, both ideologically and affectively. However, as the parties realign and the new challengers institutionalize, polarization can be expected to attenuate, and the new challengers can be expected to lose their dangerous elements and become the new mainstream parties on the right. This means that the uproar about the erosion of democracy in Europe is mistaking a transitional epiphenomenon – populism – for the real thing: the restructuring of party systems under the impact of the conflict between nationalists and cosmopolitans.

Empirical analyses confirm this interpretation of the rise of the radical right, at least in Western and Northern Europe. Thus, general political orientations combined with cultural attitudes (above all opposition to immigration, but also to European integration) have the strongest effect on the radical-right vote, and their effect has been increasing during the crisis period (2010-2023). In contrast, performance indicators, such as dissatisfaction with the government or the economy, have weaker effects on the radical right vote, and, unexpectedly, those who are satisfied with the government and the economy have been more likely to vote for the radical right during the crisis period. In some countries in Northern and Western Europe, like Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland, this new structural conflict has realigned the party system earlier than in other countries, but it has become a decisive political trend across the region. In contrast, this trend has set in belatedly in Southern Europe, where the rise of the radical right has been driven more by classic concerns linked to class and religion. In Eastern Europe, too, the rise of the radical right has only to a limited extent been associated with the cultural issues that have driven it in Western and Northern Europe. Instead, in countries such as Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia, the vote for the radical right is rather unstructured, which corresponds to the generally poorly structured Eastern European party systems.

Finally, we can rule out this new conflict between nationalists and cosmopolitans as the primary cause of democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, the two European countries where democracy has eroded the most. In these two countries, the radical right’s rise has been driven by classic general political orientations, combined with satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the government.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.