The Statecraft Institute
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Trump-Putin-Xi Shenzhen Summit: What A Possible New Yalta Moment Means For India

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The leaders of the three great powers, namely the United States, Russia and China are slated to hold talks on the sidelines of the 33rd APEC summit hosted by China in Shenzhen on Thursday. The summit is being touted as the new Yalta moment, drawing parallels with the 1945 conference in a Crimean resort city where the heads of three Allied Powers namely Britain, Soviet Union and the US met to envision a post-war order including the carving out spheres of influence in Europe.

What is different this time in Shenzhen, though, is the fact that the three powers are not allies but strategic competitors engaged in great-power rivalry and the world order is characterised by multipolarity as opposed to the bipolarity that followed the end of the Second World War .

Notably, the three great powers are not explicitly seeking a grand geopolitical bargain but have very different objectives to be pursued through this summit. For President Trump, the summit offers an opportunity to assert authority over foreign policy matters after the recent mid-term election setback apart from pursuing nuclear arms control and act as a peacemaker in the Ukraine and Iran conflicts. For President Putin, the meeting offers a negotiating window for settling the protracted Ukraine conflict on terms that are favourable to Russia apart from conceiving a new European security architecture. Besides, it would allow Moscow to counter Western isolation whilst being elevated as great-power peer of Washington and Beijing. For President Xi Jinping, the summit could help manage Beijing’s competition with Washington over matters such as Taiwan, Artificial Intelligence, supply chains, critical minerals and trade. Besides, China hopes to burnish its diplomatic stature by convening the trilateral talks and positioning itself as the steward of global peace and stability.

The proposed summit has, however, generated considerable strategic anxiety among the emerging powers of Asia and Europe. In this backdrop, how should India view this trilateral summit and what could be the implications of a potential great-power bargain over major issues that confront the world today?

For India, this summit carries both opportunities and potential risks. Firstly, diplomatic engagement among the great powers could engender global stability through management of existing differences and rivalries. Such forums open channels of communication that could reduce hostilities and ease global geopolitical tensions that manifest in the form of wars, sanctions, tariffs or weaponised supply chains.

Secondly, a potential accommodation between Moscow and Washington could ease diplomatic pressure on New Delhi over its relationship with Moscow in matters such as energy purchases.

Thirdly, if the summit helps advance the ongoing negotiations to end protracted conflicts in Ukraine and Iran, India would stand to gain through easing of supply chain pressures, lifting of sanctions, improved safety of commercial shipping and an end to its economic woes arising from exogenous shocks. An end to major conflicts could also mitigate India’s burden of undertaking a geopolitical tightrope walk owing to its multi-aligned foreign policy, thus helping preserve its strategic autonomy.

While a great-power condominium for carving up the world into spheres of influence of the kind that Yalta produced in 1945 does not seem likely today, the Shenzhen trilateral summit nonetheless carries potential risks for emerging powers and Global South countries like India. If great powers decide to settle the world’s problems, the less powerful actors could end up becoming pawns in the great-power management. The fear among less powerful states is that if they are not on the table, they will be on the menu. In other words, emerging powers may have no say in great-power decisions that could nevertheless impinge on their strategic interests.

For India, the spectre of a potential great-power concert is fraught with risks that could complicate its foreign policy underpinned by strategic autonomy. There is a possibility of strategic autonomy being reduced to a negotiable doctrine whereby great powers collaborate to further their own national interests whilst constraining the choices of other actors to act independently. For instance, a US-China accommodation over Asian security could upend the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region and complicate India’s security dynamics. Furthermore, any understanding between Beijing and Washington on critical minerals, advanced computing, tariffs and supply chains could potentially complicate Indo-US economic and technological partnership.

Another risk emanating from great-power bargaining is the potential erosion of the rules-based multilateral order: where great powers displace multilateral institutions such as the United Nations to frame rules or norms for other countries to abide by. For instance, the US and China, being the two leading AI superpowers, could set standards on AI governance without the participation of other emerging players, rendering them as mere rule takers. This could enable the two great powers to exercise coercive leverage over others and constrain technological sovereignty of emerging powers like India. Moreover, if this great power concert transmutes into a regular institutional mechanism, it could undermine India’s conception of a multipolar world order and complicate its quest to become an independent pole.

However, the chances of a formal “G3 alliance” getting institutionalised appear bleak at this point, not least due to the structural divergences among the three great powers. Nevertheless, emerging powers like India have sufficient reasons to be wary of any great-power bargaining that could potentially constrain their diplomatic choices and narrow their room for manoeuvre. The real challenge for India, then, is not whether it can stop great-power bargaining from taking place, but whether it is able to manage its relationships with all great powers whilst safeguarding its strategic autonomy.

So, even if the Shenzhen summit does not result in any grand diplomatic breakthrough or concrete deliverables, for emerging powers, the writing on the wall is clear. Navigating such a world requires internal balancing through strengthening of domestic economic, military and technological capabilities apart from the cultivation of diversified partnerships with like-minded nations as part of strategic hedging. India’s multi-vector diplomacy, predicated on strategic autonomy, is therefore no longer a diplomatic abstraction; it is, rather, a pragmatic strategic tool rooted in realism that can enable New Delhi to carve out a space for itself and participate as an equal player in a global order that seems to drift toward great-power accommodation.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.