Resentment and Radicalisation – A Guilty Couple?

States are repeatedly confronted with the challenge of extremism. Extremism represents the endpoint of a process of radicalisation, although this process does not necessarily culminate in violence. While non-violent forms of extremism also exist, extremists generally seek either to dismantle an existing political order in accordance with their ideology. To address this security challenge, prevention plays a decisive role. Once individuals have become radicalised, deradicalisation is difficult, in addition to the immediate security risks associated with radicalisation itself. Consequently, research increasingly focuses on the causes of radicalisation. Extremists are rarely irrational or mentally unstable. Rather, most perceive themselves as acting logically and consistently according to their own worldview. Their motivations are profoundly shaped by the ideology to which they adhere.

However, radicalisation does not operate solely through a seemingly rational worldview. The affective dimension also plays a crucial role. In this context, the concept of ressentiment (German term for resentment) deserves greater attention, including in research on Islamist extremism. In the following, ressentiment is conceptualised not as a discrete emotion such as anger or rage, but as an enduring affective disposition through which individuals perceive and interpret reality. Ressentiment arises from perceived experiences of humiliation and the accompanying feeling of powerlessness. Individuals see themselves as victims of an injustice against which they feel helpless. Unable to express or overcome these emotions, they suppress them. As a result, the emotions repeatedly return, like phantom pains.

The relevance of ressentiment for radicalisation lies in the fact that it is a highly contagious affect capable of being shared among like-minded individuals and transformed into a collective emotional orientation. This is made possible by the human capacity for empathy, which enables people to experience the emotions of others. When individuals identify strongly with members of their own community who are perceived as victims of injustice, they also experience their pain, anger, and frustration. In doing so, they develop solidarity with the perceived victims.

Studies such as the Ressentiment Project at the University of Münster suggest that personal experiences of humiliation are not a necessary precondition for the emergence of ressentiment. Abstract narratives describing the suffering of a particular group - for example, accounts of structural discrimination - that circulate within communities can likewise generate ressentiment as a collective emotion.

Initially, ressentiment is ideologically neutral. Yet because people generally seek causal explanations for perceived injustice, ressentiment also seeks an explanation for an unsatisfactory social reality. Radical actors exploit precisely this dynamic by providing ressentiment with ideological meaning. They deliberately reinforce narratives of victimhood. Within Islamist extremist discourse, for example, recurring claims portray Muslims as structurally discriminated against and systematically disadvantaged. According to these narratives, whenever something goes wrong in the lives of Muslims, the cause lies not in personal circumstances but solely in their identity as Muslims. In this way, Islamist actors seek to cultivate the perception that Muslims live in an entirely hostile environment.

Positive personal experiences that contradict these narratives are often reframed as mere exceptions. Individuals may therefore think: “I personally have not experienced discrimination, but we know that reality is different”. Consequently, even neutral encounters or ambiguous situations may increasingly be interpreted as hostile without critically examining whether such interpretations are justified. Once established, ressentiment shapes perception itself. This has profound consequences for social cohesion. An essentialising polarisation quickly emerges between “us, the victims” and “them, the perpetrators,” thereby facilitating the logic of conflict promoted by extremists. Support for extremist movements may increase, making it easier to initiate or sustain a struggle against a political order perceived as hostile.

This relationship is of central importance for radicalisation research. Several conclusions follow. Ressentiments arise in all societies because no society is entirely free from discrimination or perceived injustice. However, when extremist narratives of victimhood become influential and provide ressentiment with ideological meaning, ressentiment can facilitate radicalisation. Importantly, personal victimisation is not a necessary condition. People may empathise with perceived victim groups without sharing their experiences and nevertheless develop ressentiment collectively. Because ressentiment undermines trust and weakens social cohesion, it lowers barriers to radicalisation, particularly when framed as a struggle for justice on behalf of victims and against oppression.

Nevertheless, ressentiment does not inevitably lead to radicalisation. Likewise, not every radicalised individual is motivated by ressentiment; political or ideological conviction alone may suffice. The relationship between ressentiment and radicalisation therefore remains complex. It nevertheless deserves closer attention, particularly with regard to prevention. Victimhood narratives should be critically assessed to determine whether the alleged discrimination is as pervasive as claimed or whether extremist actors deliberately amplify such narratives to facilitate radicalisation. At the same time, societies must have a fundamental interest in combating genuine discrimination in order to strengthen social cohesion. Only systems that successfully balance the interests of diverse groups are likely to develop peacefully over the long term.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.