Israel at the Margins: Reordering of Peace in Middle East

Summary

The conflict in the Middle-East cannot be resolved until all the belligerents agree on a peace deal. For now it seems that the US-Iran and the Gulf have agreed for a ceasefire to discuss on the terms of the deal, whereas Israel, feeling marginalised, is distancing itself from the negotiations.

The “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran” was signed on 19 June 2026. While the 14 point MoU has halted the direct conflict between Iran and US, but Israel – a partner to the US-led ‘Operation Epic Fury’ – has been left on the sidelines.

The reasoning over the peace talks differs between US and Israel. However, what remains consistent is that their decisions are viewed as extensions of their domestic politics. For President Donald Trump, the focus may be on the upcoming mid-term elections in November 2026, while for Prime Minister Netanyahu, the goal is to shield himself from domestic criticism and charges of corruption by securing a victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections in last quarter of 2026.

The US strategy

For now, the Trump administration is doing everything possible to negotiate the final terms of the peace deal, as both sides have agreed to hold talks in Switzerland. In a recent poll by Quinnipac University, sixty per cent of US voters have called the US military action against Iran as “no worth it”. Even on personal levels, it seems that President Trump does not wish to drag the conflict any further and is waiting for ‘photo opportunity’ – a signature image of peace builder, and walk away with a deal in the Middle-East. Concerns remain in Washington, as intelligence agencies have warned of Israeli attempt to derail the peace deal. Justifying the absence of Israel from the deal, Elliott Abrams, former Special Representative for Iran and Venezuela in the Donald Trump administration, argues that by keeping the Israelis out, US gains some tactical flexibility similar to the way it has kept the other interested parties such as the Saudis and Emiratis out.

But statements from Washington hints for an all-out measure to force Iran into a ceasefire and ensure business as usual. On the question of Israeli criticism and potential derailing attempts, Vice President J.D. Vance issued a stark rebuking–“Donald J. Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time”.

Soon after the first high-level talks between the mediators from US and Iran in Switzerland, the US reiterated its support over Israeli concerns as Vance said, “We want Israel’s security to be protected, and we also want Lebanon’s sovereignty to be protected”. However, the feasibility of this approach remains questionable, as Hezbollah continues to maintain stronghold over the region.

The Israel-Hezbollah conflict

Previously the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) maintained a ‘security zone’ in southern Lebanon and secured northern Israel from direct attack of Hezbollah. But after 22 years of control the IDF finally withdrew its forces to international border on 24 May 2000. Since then, Hezbollah and Israeli forces have engaged in numerous conflicts of which the 2006 war remains crucial. Presently the IDF secured positions deep into southern and eastern Lebanon, and continues to warn the local’s with warnings of “don’t come back”.

Human right groups have criticised Israel of exporting its ‘Gaza playbook,’ as reports and satellite images reveal mass destruction of critical infrastructure and healthcare facilities as a result of Israeli bombing in southern Lebanon. Since, the very first point of the MoU calls for termination of military operations and ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The continued bombing by Israel and the government’s position of maintaining control upto the Litani River in southern Lebanon, will potentially slow down or even derail the negotiations.

The Nuclear factor

On the question of Iran’s commitment to the peace deal, Israel remains deeply sceptical of the promises by Tehran over limiting its nuclear programme. Iran’s nuclear ambitions began in late 1950s with initial support from US, France, and Germany. The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) was established in 1974, and Iranian nuclear scientists were sent abroad to learn from other’s experience. But with the 1979 Islamic revolution, the West ended its support, paving the way for Soviet Union’s entry. In 1994 Russia stepped in to help construct Iran’s first civilian nuclear plant at Bushehr. It was the same period when Iran was assessing the first Iran-Iraq war and a discussion began on potential militarisation of its nuclear program, a claim which was also mentioned in a 1992 CIA assessment report.

Within next two decades Iran claimed to have achieved a 3.5 per cent uranium enrichment in its Natanz plant, and this alarmed the West. Soon sanctions were imposed and negotiations began and finally under US led JCPOA, Iran agreed to keep its enrichment limit at 3.67 per cent for the next 15 years. But with the entry of Donald Trump in White House the first thing he did was to withdraw from the deal and re-impose sanctions on Iran. All this continued until June 2025 ‘Operation Midnight Hammer’ when for the first time US B2 Spirit stealth bombers struck nuclear sites in Iran. A similar strategy was put in place in the 2026 conflict, but once again the recent MoU seems to have weighted in support of Iran’s nuclear ambitions (at least civil nuclear programme).

The political and military leadership in Israel has long pursued a cautious approach in addressing the threat of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. This stance is deeply embedded in Israel’s strategic culture, which is shaped by constant threats and rhetoric from the theocratic regime in Tehran.

Israel’s potential to escalate conflict

Historically, during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel fought largely without the external support from the US; as under the UN Partition plan, the US along with other UN members enforced a strong arms embargo on Israel. Since then Israel has fought numerous wars and secured itself from external threats.

Given the changing geopolitical landscape and security partnerships, citing national security concerns Israel continues to launch attacks. Meanwhile, the rift between the leadership in Washington and Tel Aviv has widened due to disagreements over the prospects of a peace deal. Within Israel, Netanyahu faces significant internal pressure; with opposition parties accusing him of dragging the nation into a ‘civil war’ just to remain in power.

The other section comprises of those who support the conflict. According to a April 2026 poll 80 per cent of the Jewish respondents expressed opinion that Israel should continue fighting in Lebanon against Hezbollah, even if this causes friction vis-a-vis Washington. This domestic support remains crucial for Netanyahu, motivating him to continue the conflict atleast in southern Lebanon. In all, the failure of regime change in Iran, a continued nuclear and missile programme and the declining US-Israel relationship signs strategic failure for Israel.

Conclusion

In case Israel does not adhere to the MoU and the ongoing peace negotiations, and continues to launch strikes in Lebanon, it will be interesting to see how long Netanyahu’s “greatest friend of Israel” will unleash next round of criticism.

History tells us that during World War II, the US and UK fought against a common enemy, but as the war came close to an end, citing their respective national interests both differed on the future of peace in Europe. A similar situation can be seen today when US and Israel jointly fought a war against Iran, but now differ at the negotiating table.

In all, rationality needs to prevail because prolonged tensions could drag the region into a ‘No-War, No-Peace’ scenario, which will not be in the interest of the region and the world.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.